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INTRODUCTION

NTITRUST law has proven to be a remarkably durable part of
American public economic policy. Its success lies, in substantial
part, in its ideological commitment to an open, workable competitive economy. In practice antitrust has only made focused interventions in the economic order. At the same time, it has been a very
important shield for private economic actors, insulating them from the
continuing urge of policy-makers to impose more intrusive, direct controls. Indeed, at the start of the twentieth century, Teddy Roosevelt and
* Arthur-Bascom Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty
Development, University of Wisconsin Law School.
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many of the captains of industry had a shared vision that old-fashioned
economic competition was inconsistent with the newly-emerging industrial order and that the best response would be a public agency which
would have broad, direct regulatory authority over the new, large enterprises.' Ultimately, Congress rejected this regulatory approach and, in
adopting the Clayton Act,2 reasserted a political preference for competition as the touchstone of American economic policy. In the 1930s, the
federal agencies created pursuant the National Industrial Recovery Act
("NIRA") 3 sought to implement a regulatory and syndicalist approach to
economic organization with authorized cartels in which private trade
groups
would define fair competition and the government would enforce
it. 4 Antitrust was held in abeyance, and, in the mid-1930s, Thurman Arnold stigmatized antitrust law as the "folklore of capitalism." 5 The rise of
Soviet, Nazi, Fascist, and Japanese economic centralism during the 1930s
reinforced for many Americans the social-political linkage between open,6
competitive markets and the goals of a democratic, pluralistic society.
Thus, in the late 1930s Thurman Arnold, as Assistant Attorney General
for Antitrust, led the revival and restoration of antitrust as a guide to
American economic policy.
From the late 1930s into the late 1970s the national consensus held that
legally enforced, economic competition was, in general, the most desirable way to organize economic activity. The benefits of such competition
were both in the short run gains that result from lower prices and more
choice, and in the long run dynamic such competition imposed on market
actors. The success of the Allies in World War II, the relative superiority
of the American economy in relation to that of the centralized economies
of Eastern Europe, and the remarkable revival of the German and Japanese economies under the constraints of antitrust regulations imposed by
the victorious Americans all served to provide both economic and political vindication for a policy of enforced competition.
Starting in the late 1960s a new American deregulatory movement
sought to limit or eliminate direct governmental regulation in air travel,
trucking, telecommunications, and other traditionally regulated markets.
This movement rested on a faith that market discipline was better than
1. See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPI1890-1916 (1988); cf. RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN (1990)
2. 15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 2, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), repealed by Act
of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 648; Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 677, §§ 1-6, 48
Stat. 1183, repealed by Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 648. Both Acts
provided for the establishment of agencies to administer the NIRA during the period of
emergency (declared by the NIRA) and for the regulation of employer-employee relations.
The Supreme Court declared the regulatory program unconstitutional in United States v.
Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
4. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).
5. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THm FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937).
6. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN PoLrrICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965); see also
HAWLEY, supra note 4.
TALISM,
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regulatory control. Certainly, experience with regulation was generally
bad. Regulators stifled new innovations, fixed high prices, denied entry
into markets and generally produced undesirable economic results while
also illustrating in various ways that the end result of direct regulation
was political corruption and state control. The deregulatory movement
was widely successful in limiting or eliminating direct economic regulation in many fields. Moreover, despite the many problems with accomplishing effective transformation of these markets, 7 the positive
consequences of enhanced economic competition are visible to all.
Antitrust enforcement was caught up in the same deregulatory enthusiasm. Again embracing much older notions, many policy-makers and enforcers endorsed the assumption that markets were naturally competitive.
This meant that any intervention in the market was counter-productive
because it would upset the forces in the market. Moreover, intervention
was unnecessary to promote or protect competition because it was the
natural state of the market. This reasoning, starting in 1981, caused a
marked decline in enthusiasm for and commitment to antitrust. The old
insights were declared invalid and the old cases condemned as inefficient
intervention in the smooth workings of the market. Arguments from economic theories based on assumed industrial facts supported these claims.8
The new orthodoxy, which actually looks a lot like the view of some economists and many business leaders at the beginning of the twentieth century and in the NIRA era, was that antitrust should back off enforced
competition and let the economy be "free." Such freedom included the
right to combine into super-large enterprises which often had very large
shares of specific markets and to enter into agreements of all kinds.
World markets, complex new industrial and technological needs, etc.,
were once again the rallying cry for those who opposed competition and
the laws that enforced it.
During the 1980s tough rules against mergers among competitors as
well as among large firms, regardless of their current economic interaction, were abandoned. First, many large combinations measured in both
market share terms and overall size were permitted. Second, under the
slogan of "fix it first," the enforcement agencies undertook to bargain
with buyers to define narrow divestitures which would eliminate the most
egregious aspects of the combination, thereby allowing the combination
to proceed. Previously, a merger which was bad in any aspect was illegal
and thus could not be consummated at all. In the area of agreements,
there was a similar loss of interest in critical examination of new multifirm undertakings that often imposed large scale control over economic
activity. For example, the FTC permitted the first and third largest car
7. See Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating "Deregulation" of Commercial Air TravelFalse Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 109 (1989).
8. Peter C. Carstensen, How to Assess the Impact of Antitrust on the American Economy: Examining History or Theorizing?, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1175 (1989).
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companies in the world to enter into a joint venture to produce cars. 9
Critical review of distribution restraints was dropped, 10 and, except in
health care, the enforcement agencies were not visible as critical reviewers of other agreements among competitors, customers and suppliers that
directly and indirectly linked increasingly large segments of the economy." Concentrated markets were no longer seen as posing in themselves risks of inefficient or anticompetitive harms. In sum, most of the
policies of the prior forty years, developed out of actual experience with
the economy, were jettisoned based on purportedly new learning and theories about how markets ought to work.
The goal of this essay is argue that the older policies of antitrust were
better, long-run rules for the effective governance of a dynamic economy.
In particular, there were four major studies published during the 1980s
that, in my view, provide theoretical, historical, and contemporary empirical support for important parts of the traditional standards and concerns
of antitrust. The four books are: Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in
American Business, 1895-1904 (1985); David J. Ravenscraft and F.M.
Scherer, Mergers, Sell-Offs, & Economic Efficiency (1987); and Leonard
Weiss (editor), Concentration and Price (1989).
Taken together, these four works address central issues in antitrust policy: collusion and concentration. They teach that collusion in concentrated markets as a matter of theory, history, and current experience is a
durable strategy; they teach that concentration is very likely to produce
economic costs rather than gains; and they teach that there are few, if
any, observable economic benefits from the combinations that create
concentration.
Weaving together these historical, empirical, economic, and game theory strands creates a strong case for the older view of concentrated structures. This in turn argues for stricter, more vigorously enforced merger
standards, for continued efforts to devise ways of bringing about deconcentration of oligopolistic and monopolistic markets, and for renewed
concern for the ways in which agreements among economic actors can
result in the "evolution of cooperation." In sum, the long run best economic interest of the United States is still best served by actively enforcing competition.
The next section provides a summary of the four works of scholarship
from the 1980s that should be central to public policy governing antitrust
in the next century. Part III will then discuss some of the implications for
public policy that these works suggest.
9. Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 596 F. Supp 416 (D.D.C. 1984).
10. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1985 Vertical Restraint Guidelines.
11. See Steven Schneider, Comment, A Functional Rule-of-Reason Analysis for the
Law of Resale Price Maintenance and its Application to Spray-Rite v. Monsanto, 1984
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THE "LOST" LEARNING FROM THE 1980s

The learning discussed below is lost only to those actively involved in
making antitrust policy. Historians are quite aware of Professor Lamoreaux's work, and economists know of both the Ravenscraft and Scherer
study and Professor Weiss's work. Scholars in a broader range of fields,
including law, are aware of Axelrod's work. Antitrust scholarship has,
however, remained in ignorance of this work.
Axelrod and the Ravenscraft and Scherer books have received some
attention. In early June 1995, the Lexis law review collection had 159
articles with references to Axelrod's work, but only a handful of those
articles had anything to do with antitrust. Indeed, Professor John Wiley
of UCLA, who wrote an article exploring some of the implications of
Axelrod's work, 12 and myself account for most of these antitrust references. Ravenscraft and Scherer were cited in thirty-eight articles in the
Lexis archive. Of these articles, twenty-one were on non-antitrust aspects
of corporate takeover policy while seventeen had explicit antitrust focus.
Only six antitrust articles have referenced Weiss's work-one with total
inaccuracy' 3-and I, a colleague of Weiss's, was the author of two of the
remaining articles that referred to his work. Lamoreaux has gone unnoticed in the legal academy save for a single reference in an article I wrote
on the history of antitrust. This survey suggests that these works remain
largely unexplored by antitrust scholars. It is my contention that serious
discussion of both the history and the policy of antitrust requires consideration of these works, even if one ultimately rejects the implications I
have drawn from them.
This discussion starts with theory-Axelrod's explanation of the conditions for durable collusion. Axelrod's theory provides a base from which
to examine the intrinsically interesting historical work of Lamoreaux on
the great merger wave at the start of the twentieth century, as well as
Weiss's work on concentration. In this analysis, the Ravenscraft and
Scherer work provides an important contribution because it counsels us
that merger is not, in itself, likely to enhance efficiency. This means that
the down-side risks of a strict policy to discourage new concentration and
unravel old is unlikely to produce serious negative effects. In the interest
of chronological sequence, I will consider the Ravenscraft and Scherer
book prior to Weiss's. This sequence will also allow us to see that Lamoreaux's skeptical conclusions about major mergers at the turn of the century are consistent with the contemporary data examined by Ravenscraft
and Scherer.

12. John S. Wiley Jr., Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner's
Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1906 (1988).
13. Frank H. Easterbrook, Correspondence, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MiCH. L.
REv. 1696, 1698 n.6 (1986) (asserting that Weiss had "retreated" from the position that
concentration had negative competitive implications).
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EXPLAINING COLLUSION

Robert Axelrod is a political scientist interested in promoting "cooperation" among contending groups. He had a particular interest in the development of cooperation among nations who are hostile to each other.
The kind of social problem that interested him was one in which there
were net gains to cooperation, but in which betrayal could also produce
gains. Moreover, he saw this as a long term, repeat process. A repeated
"prisoner's dilemma" game is a classic example of this problem. The basic statement of this game is that each of two prisoners will be best off if
she confesses and implicates the other, so long as the other prisoner continues to deny the crime. In that case, the prisoner who has betrayed will
get a substantial reward while the other will suffer punishment. The next
best solution from the perspective of either prisoner occurs if both prisoners deny the crime (a conspiracy of silence), then neither will be punished; however, neither will gain the largest potential individual reward.
The worst case, from the perspective of either prisoner, occurs if both
implicate the other. In that case both will be punished, but neither will be
punished as severely as would have been the case if only one of them had
been found guilty. The result of the reward structure is to create a richly
varied set of outcomes and a simple but analytically interesting context in
which to consider strategic behavior.
The implications of the reward structure are that cooperation between
two rivals will yield a better result than mutual betrayal; but in any specific game, the "best" individual outcome is to betray the other party if
that party is cooperating. On the other hand, if betrayal is likely, then the
target is better off refusing to cooperate (mutual betrayal). The game
further assumes that there can be no direct communication between the
two prisoners. They can not overtly bargain or make other commitments
that would make cooperation more creditable. There are a number of
limits to this two player game, thus it translates as, at best, a rough approximation of the more complex real world. Still, like any good model,
it abstracts key features of the real world into a very simple and elegant
paradigm that is amenable to a variety of tests and investigations.
Axelrod's contribution was to conduct an experiment in which he solicited computer programs from around the world to develop strategies to
play a repeated, computer game version of the prisoner's dilemma game.
Axelrod's version involved positive pay-offs for each kind of response.
He ranked successful cooperation with the highest score (six points),
which was split between the players (three points for each player); successful betrayal (five points for the successful party and none for the victim) ranked second; mutual non-cooperation earned each player one
point (a total payoff two points).14

14.

ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

30-31 (1984).
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Axelrod was interested in identifying how strategies work when the
game was repeated many times. Repetition is a key element in his
approach:
What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that the
players might meet again .... [C]hoices made today not only determine the outcome of this move, but can also influence the later
choices of the players. The future can therefore cast a shadow back
15
upon the present and thereby affect the current strategic situation.
Repetition, however, is not enough. The discount rate on the future is
also a very important consideration, because developing cooperation depends on "the next move" having a large enough value relative to the
present move "to make the future loom large in the calculation of total
payoffs."'1 6 In addition, the strategies of the other players17are important
constraints on how well any particular strategy will work.
Basically, Axelrod found that cooperation is a robust strategy in a
world in which at least some other players want to cooperate and there
are positive rewards for such cooperation. Moreover, among cooperative
strategies, the best strategy is also a very simple one: tit for tat. It is,
indeed, a modified version of the Golden Rule: Do to others what they
have done to you, but always assume the best about them. Thus the strategy is a "nice" one.' 8 It assumes others want to cooperate. Its opening
move is cooperative. If the other player responds cooperatively, then Tit
for Tat stays cooperative, and both parties achieve a result that maximizes
the long run potential gains.' 9 If the other player's strategy is to "cheat",
i.e., betray Tit for Tat, then on the next move Tit for Tat will not cooperate. If the other strategy returns to cooperation, Tit for Tat never holds a
grudge. Hence on the following move it will cooperate again.
"Mean" strategies, ones which try to trick others, tend to be self-consuming and so will drop out after a time as they face an increasingly hostile world. Non-cooperative strategies are also stable.20 But, of course,
players using such a strategy will get lower returns over time. Thus, absent constraint, it would make sense for any prisoner in Axelrod's structure to seek to determine if the other prisoner will cooperate.
The book contains important strategic advice for players of such
"games" as to how to create and maintain cooperation. 2 1 Important for
our purposes is that the more interactions between players, the easier it is
15. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 15.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 33.
19. It is a realistic maximum because, although successful betrayal would yield a
greater gain in the short run, it is extremely unlikely that in the long run of repeated
games, such gains would continue. It is possible to imagine a long run theoretic optimum
for each party in which it continually successfully betrays the other. The only illustration
that I can think of demonstrating such persistent error on the part of one party is Lucy's
duping Charlie Brown every year with respect to her holding the football for him to kick.
See Charles Schultz, Peanuts in the Sunday comics.
20. Axelrod, supra note 14, at 62-63.
21. l& at 124-41.
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to create and maintain a cooperative strategy. 22 One can see this as a
learning curve or a simple communications system. Either way, if the
players interact more, they can more quickly and with greater certainty
define each other's strategy and seek the mutual benefit in cooperation.
Moreover, the information communicated is not product line or activity
specific. Hence, learning from one kind of interaction can be carried over
easily to any other interaction between the two players.
Another interesting and important observation is that each player
should focus on its own relative gains. Axelrod propounds the maxim
that it is counter productive to be "envious. ' 23 One should not focus on
how much the other player is getting; each player should only focus on
whether or not his choices are maximizing his long run payoff.
Axelrod's version of the prisoner's dilemma game has an obvious parallel to economic behavior. The prisoner's dilemma is the equivalent of a
cartel arrangement: If A induces B to behave in cartelistic manner (reduce output and raise prices), and A then cheats on B (the same as a
confession implicating the other), A can make the largest profit. If A and
B can each trust each other, they will share the cartel profit. Neither will
be as well off as it could have been if it succeeded in betraying the other,
but each will be better off than if they adopt the third possibility: competing with each other (the same thing as both confessing). Moreover, as in
Axelrod's game, cartels need to operate over time to produce real benefits for their participants. The participants themselves are tied to longterm activity as well as to specific investments which means that the future will indeed cast a "long shadow" over the present. As in Axelrod's
version of the game, the rewards for conspiracy are likely to be increased
relative profits over a competitive (non-cooperative) solution.
Given the obvious analogy to vital antitrust issues, Axelrod's effort to
test strategies to solve the prisoner's dilemma problem has great significance for understanding the problems presented to antitrust law by an
economy that features large numbers of oligopolistic markets, vast conglomerate enterprise, and a sense that firms are not always as competitive
as they might be. Axelrod seems unaware that he is discussing collusion
and cartel building except for a few fleeting passages; 24 yet his study,
viewed from an antitrust perspective, addresses the question of the conditions under which tacit economic collusion ("cooperation") can be durable. 25 The work also provides a theoretical context for testing claims of
tacit collusion; it identifies conditions necessary for such behavior to exist; it predicts that such cooperation will be robust in the face of competitive disruption so long as the long term (the shadow of the future) is a
strong influence; and it identifies specific kinds of strategies we might ex22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 130.
Id. at 110.
See, e.g., id. at 65.
There is a surprising lack of sophisticated thinking and analysis about when and

how collusion will occur in industry. This gap means that Axelrod's work should be central
to realistic theorizing.
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pect to observe firms employ over time in promoting collusion. There are
also implications for market structure because the model predicts how
the relationships among actors (numbers and interactions) will affect anticompetitive, interdependent conduct. As such it provides an interpretative framework within which we can locate both historical and
contemporary data about collusive conduct, especially in concentrated
markets.
For Axelrod, cooperation is a good thing and betrayal is bad. His primary concerns are with contexts (e.g., international peace) in which cooperation is desirable. However, when viewed in terms of market behavior,
the points of reference need to be reversed. Cooperation is collusion and
seeks to create, allocate and exploit market power. Mutual betrayal is
simply competition on the merits in which producers sell at a price approximating cost.
One very interesting aspect of the game model is that it undercuts the
conventional conception of price competition. In the game context,
profit maximization in the long run conflicts with profit maximization in
the short run. The highest short-run profit results from betrayal of the
cooperating (colluding) other party. In the long run, however, such actions will inevitably result in lower future profits. The best solution in the
long run (assuming that the future is not discounted too heavily) is to
take the cooperative gain which is less than the short run maximum. The
model of price competition used in micro price theory in which monopoly
(successful betrayal) and competition are the only alternatives thus assumes what now appears to be a totally unrealistic set of options for market participants. The best long-run option may well be collusion!
Traditional antitrust and economic analysis has assumed that it is very
hard to reach and retain the middle ground of successful collusion. 26 The
temptation to cheat, it is argued, is so great that absent effective, overt
policing no cartel can be very stable over time. Cheating is assumed to be
in the self interest of each participant. They are assumed to operate with
"mean" strategies. This analysis relies heavily on the assumption of
short-run profit maximization. Only if enterprises ignore the future
would the short-run gain of cheating be very likely to overwhelm the
longer run advantage of a stable cartelistic arrangement. Indeed, successful cartelization implies, not implausibly, that rational economic actors
seeking to maximize returns from assets with long lives recognize that in
the long run cheating is not a viable strategy. Cheating leads to competition, the third and worst, from the perspective of the participants, outcome. From a social perspective, of course, cheating (mutual betrayal) is
the preferred outcome; moreover, in a world dominated by betrayers
(i.e., competitors) competition is a stable result. Indeed, the short run,
static perspective of price theory, therefore, declares the firms in a cartel
26. The best argument for the problems in collusion is found in John S. McGee, Ocean
Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHi. L. REV. 191

(190).
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are behaving "irrationally" by refusing to compete on price and so capture greater profits and sales volume.
Axelrod's contribution is to show that a simple strategy for cooperation
(collusion) can work very successfully. Indeed, his experiments suggest
that a few colluders can ultimately come to dominate over those who
follow a strategy of competition (no cooperation). This is significant on
two levels. First, it suggests that when a more realistic time perspective is
assumed, cooperation among competitors emerges as both rational and
workable. Second, if a few firms can cooperate successfully, they will,
over time, come to dominate their context. Manifestly, such cooperation
has to involve a set of customers or suppliers who for one reason or another have no recourse but to deal with the colluding parties. Such context have in fact been observed in real antitrust cases and in theories
about competition. 27 It is important to recognize that the success of these
collusive responses also assume key economic facts regarding limited entry and exit from the market as well as the continuity of the long run
shadow of the future.
Another interesting implication of Axelrod's analysis comes from his
proof that players need to focus on their own gains and not those accruing to other players in deciding on a course of conduct. The dominant
theories for antitrust in the 1980s held that unequal returns to firms in
concentrated industries was a refutation of the existence of collusion
among firms. The assumption was that if there was collusion then all
firms would have had similar profits. The Axelrod analysis of collusion
shows that such an assumption is false. 28
The conclusions one can draw from this work is that tacit collusion is a
stable and robust prospect for businesses in any market situation if the
participants can establish a pattern of cooperation. But cooperation is a
learned strategy, requiring the parties to understand their long run interests and to value those interests above short run interests. This in turn
implies that there will be conditions under which there will and will not
be a good chance to develop cooperation. Concentration, whether horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate, will increase the chances of cooperation
because it will increase the interactions among any set of firms. New
products, new technologies, or other dramatic changes in the given condi27. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (sellers of
boxes to specific customers colluded as to prices to that particular customer). See generally
Richard S. Markovits, An Ideal Antitrust Law Regime, 64 TEX. L. REv. 251, 253-66 (1985)
(arguing that in general sellers operate in an economic context in which most customers,
for reasons of geography, taste or other constraints, have relatively few effective choices;
hence, collusion between the first and second options can be important in exploiting customers). See also MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY: STUDIES IN IMPACT (Robert E.
Kuenne ed., 1967).
28. One can get the same conclusion from traditional micro- price theory. Under this
theory, the marginal firm will barely break even. The theory never posited that all firms

would have equal costs. Hence the theory would not predict that a cartel which included

marginal firms would produce equal profits. All conspirators would be better off than in a
competitive world. So long as they had no envy for the more successful conspirators, disparate profits are no bar to collusion.
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tion of the market can seriously disrupt existing understandings. Entry
by non-cooperative firms, when they reach certain levels in the market,
can cause a rapid disintegration of cooperation. This disintegration
would occur because it will be increasingly difficult to find buyers who
lack access to a non-cooperative seller. In such a world, it would become
very costly to continue to follow a cooperative strategy; indeed, the basic
tit for tat strategy would lead all firms to engage in consistently competitive responses because there would be no observed cooperation.
The foregoing suggests the importance of strategies of exclusion and
response. Limiting the potential for new entry, defining ways to punish
non-cooperative behavior by existing firms, and ensuring clear communication of conduct are all important. In real world terms, creating conditions in which the future will loom large for competitors is a step toward
creating a context in which tacit collusion will be a durable strategy. The
strategy itself is one that can emerge out of rational interaction in specific
contexts. Hence, if such collusion is undesirable, an important objective
for public policy becomes avoiding such contexts.
What Axelrod contributes to conventional antitrust analysis is the information that a simple, conduct-based, non-verbal strategy can achieve
and maintain cooperation under plausible conditions of concentration.
Moreover, this strategy is a durable and dominant one. Thus, if firms
adopt this strategy, they are likely to persist in using it unless there is a
radical change in conditions.
There are several important caveats to transferring Axelrod's work directly into antitrust law. 29 As with any model, this model simplifies and
abstracts key elements. One of the most interesting is the "shadow of the
future," because it is central to the pressure for cooperation. Axelrod's
game involves constant future rewards. This means, first, that new entry
which reduces gains is not allowed. The general suggestion one might
draw is that only if future gains appear likely and stable is collusion attractive. As suggested above, this implies that parties already engaged in
a cooperative game would have to adopt strategies to control and limit
new entry and alternative technologies. The work of Salop and Krattenmaker on raising rivals costs is relevant here. 30 It also suggests that
such controls produce value for all participants only if there is or will be
cooperation which in turn implies that the moves necessary to create conditions for anticompetitive cooperation may be constrained by free riding
and collective action problems. However, where a market has evolved to
create such conditions, then anticompetitive cooperation is a very attractive strategy.
Because Axelrod's game saw cooperation as a positive force, it has no
antitrust type penalty. The rewards for cooperation are not discounted
by the threat of liability. A possible implication of his analysis is that a
29. See Wiley, supra note 12.
30. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
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sanction that captured most or all of the rewards that a specific firm expected, on a random basis, could effectively deter such cooperative conduct by limiting the shadow of the cooperative future. Interestingly, this
would suggest vigorous antitrust enforcement aimed at collusion, including tacit collusion, with the actual imposition of substantial liability as a
deterrent to other conspiracies. Reducing the "shadow of the future" involves either direct sanctions or changing the number of players, especially for future gains, so that cooperation is less attractive. Enforcing
mutual non-cooperation (competition) requires that the expected future
gains from cooperation be reduced.
Because the parameters of the game are fully defined, Axelrod gives
the players no incentive to develop alternative ways to do things that
might lower their operating costs or otherwise alter the expected payoff
from non-cooperation. There is, thus, no dynamic in the market that underlies this model. Clearly, the impact of this lack of dynamic is that the
incentives to engage in non-cooperative efforts are understated. If one
can win big though developing a new product, a new production process,
or some other way to alter the outcome of the game (it is as if Axelrod
added an option that allowed a prisoner to escape and get all the money),
then there are several futures that might have to be balanced to see which
shadow is more attractive. Of course, the Axelrod strategy would predict
that a major concern among firms engaged in a tit for tat prisoner's dilemma would be how to stabilize and control those risks that would disrupt their ongoing game. Once again, the obvious prediction is that one
might expect to see substantial sharing of or joint ventures in research
and development, lobbying to regulate or eliminate alternative methods
of production (e.g., environmental controls), or other strategies that limit
new entry or different methods of competition.
Finally, the question remains, is Axelrod's two player model a valid
one? It does call for interaction among all strategies but only in one on
one situations. If one adopts the views of Markovits and Kuenne-that
the economic world is one of monopolistic competition in which for a
wide range of reasons, most buyers and sellers have very limited
choices-then the view that many economic decisions are consistent with
a prisoner's dilemma game is plausible. 31 Individual business decisions
involve small group contexts in general. One would also predict that actions and decisions would appear quite different if buyers had a substantial number of equally plausible choices. Most conventional price theory
is built on such a model without any empirical testing to determine
whether that model has wide application in the real world of functioning
markets.
The implications of Axelrod's model in a world of three or four prisoners, on the other hand, seems to be increased complexity but little substantive change. The time it would take for firms to learn whether or not
31. See AXELROD, supra note 14; Kuenne, supra note 27; Markovits, supra note 27.
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all participants were cooperating could be a problem. The identification
of "cheaters" (i.e., those attempting to betray cooperation) might be
more complex. Indeed, these considerations lead easily to the prediction
that multi-firm oligopolies would be likely to pursue strategies of organization with respect to distribution and marketing that would serve the
purpose of effective coordination. The firms would do so if the future
cast a substantial shadow over the present and the firm understood the
gains from a workable policy of cooperation along the lines of tit for tat.
Thus, despite some reservations, Axelrod gives us a far better idea of
how collusion can be created and maintained. He has tested the strategy
against others and has shown that it is robust and effective under conditions not dissimilar from those governing important parts of the real economic world. The key question then becomes whether or not this
explanation of cooperation has any relation to historical experience with
competition or to current information about market consequences.
B.

LAMOREAUX AND THE HISTORY OF CONCENTRATION

Professor Naomi Lamoreaux published her evaluation of the merger
movement of 1895-1904 only a year after Axelrod's book appeared.3 2 As
a result, her description, while influenced by sophisticated economic theories of oligopoly, did not draw on the insights generated by his study of
repeat playing of the prisoner's dilemma game. However, her description
of the evolution of market behavior in a range of industries in the period
provides a very illuminating set of examples of how cooperation can and
does evolve in the real world of business.
At the turn of the century there was a massive wave of consolidations-as a result of the merging of several firms in various industrieswhich reached a high point in 1899. 3 Over 1800 firms were absorbed in
these consolidations.34 These consolidations resulted in enterprises often
holding very substantial shares of the market.3 5 Of the ninety-three such
consolidations for which national market share data was available, seventy-two resulted in market share control in excess of forty percent and
36
forty-two resulted in market control in excess of seventy percent.
Moreover, many of the twenty-one consolidations with less than forty
percent market shares involved goods such as beer where the effective
market area was local or regional.3 7 These statistics would suggest that
many of these combinations may also have created substantial regional
market concentrations.3 8 The combinations were largely focused in in32. NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX,
1895-1904 (1985).
33. Id. at 2 and table 1.1.
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34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2 and table 1.2.
37. Id

38. LAMOREAUX, supra note 32, at 3 and table 1.2 (7 of the 21 consolidations with less
than 40% national market shares involved brewing, which was a regional or local market).
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dustries that had experienced rapid technological change and substantial
new entry from firms with large productive capacities. The resulting industrial contexts involved some of the classic elements of the prisoner's
dilemma; firms with large capacity relative to total demand, similar costs,
39
and a mutual recognition of the potential for gains from cooperation. If
firms could cooperate, then they would share in stable monopolistic
prices. However, there were also very substantial potential gains from
betrayal. For example, if others could be induced to raise prices, the betrayer could undercut the prevailing price and lock up a large, profitable
part of the market. Of course, if all firms promised to raise prices and
then betrayed each other, the result was the worst case for the firms: persistent non-cooperation would cause prices to fall until they reached cost,
denying the new firms substantial profits.
Lamoreaux examined in detail two sets of industries. The first set experienced rapid technological or demand changes in the 1890s. These industries had substantial new entry. However, the period of rapid growth
was followed by economic recession which reduced the growth in demand
that had fueled entry and profit expectations.
The second group involved similar industries in terms of technological
complexity and capital intensity. The second group differed from the first
in that entry and growth had occurred in the 1880s so that by the time of
the recession of the 1890s the firms had a longer history of experience
with each other.
In both sets of industries there were very high fixed costs so that running a plant at full production meant that average total cost per unit was
substantially lower. This full production in the face of declining demand
meant that prices had to be discounted-often very deeply-to make
sales. The discounted prices caused revenues to fall on a per unit basis.
However, the fact that fixed costs were relatively substantial meant that it
remained economically rational to cut prices so long as the price received
exceeded variable costs and made some contribution toward the fixed
costs. Thus, the industries faced a cycle of deep price cutting whenever
demand declined if each firm sought to act independently.
The alternative pricing strategy was to hold prices at as nearly a constant level as was possible and adjust output. This would yield a better
outcome so long as all firms cooperated. Revenue would still decline, but
not nearly as much. Assuming that demand declined modestly, the losses
would be shared by all firms at levels that most could comfortably afford.
In comparing the two types of industries, Lamoreaux found a marked
difference. The new, expanding industries were unable to stabilize prices.
They had no capacity to trust each other. Even when they entered into
overt and formal conspiracies, someone would defect. The result was that
price wars resumed. Indeed, the general pattern was persistent price wars
39. Id. at 46-49.
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during the entire period of declining demand. Only with economic
growth was there any real recovery in prices.
There was, during this same time period, a surge in consolidations.
Lamoreaux argues that most of these mergers were for anticompetitive
purposes.4 0 She finds no efficiency gains from these consolidations. Instead, the stated goals of these consolidations were to acquire control
over the industry and raise prices. 41 However, most of these combinations failed to achieve any noticeable power over price in this period.
Entry into some lines remained fairly easy because unintegrated suppliers
existed in sufficient number to support entry. Secondly, some firms remained outside the consolidation; those firms, having comparable efficiency, could and did expand production and engage in vigorous price
competition after the consolidation of competitors. As a result, the combinations did not have much success in raising prices so long as economic
42
conditions remained depressed and competitors would not cooperate.
In marked contrast, the comparable industries which had experienced
similar growth a decade earlier did not experience either the radical decline in prices or the massive consolidation of their newer sisters. 43 Examples abound of tit for tat type behavior in rail production and other
industries." These strategies worked. Price cutting was attempted, but it
ceased quickly with revised tacit understandings among the parties.
The most instructive period, however, came a few years later in 1907
when another economic down turn threatened to generate substantial
price competition. This time cooperation was the dominant strategy even
among the industries where price cutting had been common a decade earlier. The dominant firms in particular could see the long shadow of the
future. They had also, more or less self-consciously, reduced or eliminated the easy ways to make entry into the particular line of business by
vertical integration which absorbed many of the key sources of inputs.
When other firms began to undercut the prevailing price, the dominant
firms would respond with price cuts to ensure that the deviant understood
that it could not gain market share by price competition. Tit for tat
worked in the paper and tin-plate industries. 45 Of the steel industry generally, Lamoreaux observes:
The [U.S.] Steel Corporation maintained prices until its officers felt
that competitors were obtaining too large a share of the business.
Then (typically during downturns) U.S. Steel suddenly reduced its
quotations.... [O]ver time, the periods of price maintenance grew
longer and bouts of price cutting less frequent .... By mid-decade,

40. Id at 87.
41. Id at 62.
42. Id. at 62-86.
LAMOREALIX, supra note 32, at 62-86.
44. Id.
45. Id at 126-34 (paper), 135-36 (tin-plate).
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the independent firms had, for all practical purposes, joined
U.S.
46
Steel in a cartel to restrain production and support prices.
What Lamoreaux describes as the history of these mass production industries is a classic example of a prisoner's dilemma game played out in a
real world context. We start with a group of firms with roughly similar
productive efficiency and capacity which are few in number and so recognize their interdependency. Initially, each firm recognizes that it can
make greatest profits in the short run if it can induce others to cut production and raise prices, while it betrays the agreement and runs at full
capacity while undercutting by a little the agreed prices. Again and again
the firms tried to collude, but each time one or more firms betrayed the
conspiracy. They followed a "mean" strategy. The result was full blown
competition (mutual non-cooperation) in which prices fell and output remained high. In terms of the prisoner's game, this is the worst result for
the players. In terms of economic theory, this is competition (non-cooperation) from which society reaps the greatest social gain. Even large
scale combination failed to deter the efforts to exploit short run opportunities. Only the renewal of substantial economic growth ended this first
period of price competition.
The next step in this history were wide-spread mergers which created
tight oligopoly or monopoly situations. The list of combinations that
achieved over seventy percent market control is impressive. Another
even larger group resulted in firms having over forty percent market
shares. While past historians have argued that stock market interests or
efficiency goals explained this wave of mergers, Professor Lamoreaux's
careful re-examination of these transactions convinces her that the objective behind many of the combinations was expressly anticompetitive market control.
Yet the first crest of this merger wave did not have that effect. It was
overwhelmed by new entry and by vigorously competitive conduct by the
remaining firms. Combination of some competitors neither created cooperation among the remaining firms nor created any exclusionary effect.
The strategies remained non-cooperative. Each firm was trying to grab
all it could get with the result that competition still dominated.
By the time of the next economic downturn, the new industries had
learned how to cooperate. They did not compete on price; technology
and entry were more restrained. Read in light of Axelrod, Lamoreaux
has provided an almost perfect description of the development of a tit for
tat strategy leading to stable, cooperative anticompetitive conduct in industries characterized by relatively high levels of concentration and stable
technology. Another important feature of this description is the way in
which the dominant firms sought to acquire control over key inputs, patents or other means that would entrench their position over time. They
deliberately sought to create longer future shadows as they forced their
46. Id at 136.
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rivals to make similar investments and as they made new entry more difficult. Now the firms in the industry could see a long, mutual relationship.
In such a context, even partial and limited cooperation made increasing
economic sense.
The implication for the future of this history suggests that concentration does in fact breed cooperation and anticompetitive results. These
results are, however, tempered by new entry and technological change, as
both of these forces reduce the shadow cast by the future.
By 1907 or 1908, the Sherman Act's 47 prohibition on monopoly was
sufficiently defined as to prevent the kind of consolidations that had occurred prior to 1900. The Northern Securities decision 48 in 1904 probably
resolved that question even before Standard Oil49 and American Tobacco50 made merger to monopoly too risky. The effort to turn back the
clock and undo more of the consolidations that had moved the economy
toward cooperation and away from competition was not very successful.
Even the leading cases such as Northern Securities, Standard Oil, and
American Tobacco did not restore fully competitive conditions. In the
case of the oil industry, over many decades, change and growth, together
with the limits on new mergers, may well have moved that industry back
toward workable competition. Other examples of gradual change exist. 51
My suggestion is that antitrust enforcers should look at Lamoreaux's
report of the impact of massive consolidation in technologically developing industries and consider the relevance of that experience to new areas
of similar change, such as health care and telecommunications. The long
run implications of concentrated structures where barriers to new entry
remain high or are enhanced is that, as cooperation among competitors
evolves, there is likely to be a substantial loss of competition over time.

C.

EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE

In the mid-1980s, Ravenscraft and Scherer looked at the empirical information about the consequences of mergers.5 2 Their findings suggest
that merger is not a major source of efficiency for the economy. Toward
the end of the decade, Leonard Weiss collected and published a set of
studies of concentrated markets which showed that these markets systematically tend to produce inefficient and undesirable results.5 3 In combination, these projects evaluating contemporary market performance
strongly supported the historical work of Lamoreaux, and again suggest
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

48. United States v. Northern Sec. Co., 120 F. 721 (C.C.D. Minn. 1903), aff'd, 193 U.S.
197 (1904).
49. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1 (1911), superseded by statute as stated
in, United States v. Trammel, 899 F.2d 1483 (6th Cir. 1990).
50. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
51. See Carstensen, supra note 8, at 1198 (discussing the meat packing industry).
52. See DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFr & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND EcoNOMIC EFFICIENCY (1987).
53. CONCENTRATION AND PRICE (Leonard W. Weiss ed., 1989).
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(especially Weiss) that cooperation has evolved in such markets exactly as
Axelrod's experiments would have predicted.
1.

The Inefficiency of Merger

Even if concentrated industries impose economic costs because the
risks of collusive conduct are real, persistent, robust, and substantial, a
counterclaim, strongly advanced during the 1980s, was that mergers and
consolidations produced major efficiencies. If combinations generally
had positive effects, then public policy would have to be very attentive to
balancing the anticompetitive dangers against the potential or actual efficiency gains that such transactions produced. Indeed, as at the turn of the
century, there are many policy-makers, including the new head of the
FTC, Robert Pitofsky, who seem to believe that big firms are inherently
more efficient and that merger is the way to create such firms. 54 Such a
policy perspective suggests that even if the merging firms obtain a larger
share of the gains than a purely competitive solution would have allowed,
society has, on balance, also gained.
Indeed, during the 1980s there were a spate of takeovers and mergers
in which very large premiums were paid for acquired firms. It was contended in many scholarly writings, especially in the corporate law debate
over takeover regulation, that such combinations had to be efficiency enhancing because no visible market power gains resulted from many of
these combinations. Viewed from the perspective of the mid-1990s, it is
now apparent that many expectations were exaggerated, very much like
the experience of a number of the great combinations of the 1890s. Large
firms went into bankruptcy as a result of their inability to service the debt
they undertook. Few real successes emerged. By 1995, de-conglomeratization was the watchword for many segments of the economy. The dissolution of the vast ITT" enterprise is the most visible example of the
changed view of the capacity of managers to control vast and dispersed
enterprises.
Despite the actual events of the 1990s, the faith continues that large
enterprise is good and that large combinations imply economies. Moreover, it is still the case that in combinations substantial premiums are being paid. Such premiums over prior market price suggest that the buyer
must expect to get a greater gain than the prior owners. How can that
occur? Improved efficiency is the answer most likely to be suggested.
This is not, however, the only potential explanation for such a premium.
The work of Professor Coffee, for example, suggests that the premium

54. Robert Pitofsky, The Future of Antitrust, Remarks at the Symposium Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Antitrust Division, in ANTITRUST
BULL., Dec. 22, 1994, at 11. See also In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 820-22 (1978) (Pitofsky, J., concurring), aff'd, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 461 U.S. 940

(1983).
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may reflect a reallocation of entitlement to the wealth produced by the
55
corporation.
Some unreported work that I have done compared a sample of management buyouts with third party acquisitions of publicly traded corporations during the 1980s. I found no significant difference in the relative
premiums paid. This would support the proposition that something other
than enhanced efficiency explains the high prices paid in many corporate
takeovers and buyouts.5 6 The effort to explain the prices paid in such
transactions is not the focus of this discussion. Rather, I wish only to start
with the observation that premiums will be paid if buyers believe that
they will capture some value that justifies the price paid, whether or not
that value comes from increased efficiency. The point of interest for competition policy is whether or not efficiency gains are likely consequences
of such transactions. We already have Lamoreaux's analysis of the past,
which showed that there were few if any gains in those transactions.
Ravenscraft and Scherer used the FTC's line of business data set to
examine the consequences of mergers and acquisitions. The FTC in 1974
initiated the collection of a large body of product and plant specific data
from a group of leading American corporations. The explicit goal of this
project was to create a data set that would provide useful and relevant
empirical data on central questions of-market behavior and performance.
The data set was collected only from 1974 to 1977, when the FTC, under
congressional pressure, abandoned the project. It covered about 450
large American corporations. Using this data it was possible to examine
the consequences of mergers and acquisitions that had occurred during
the merger wave of the late 1960s and even to look backward as far as
1950 when the FTC first collected reports tracking such transactions.
There are vast problems with data analyses in such an undertaking. The
authors are at great pains to explain the difficulties and problems that
beset any effort to make systematic statements over time about information drawn from diverse corporate records. Still, they found that the data
produced some reasonably clear results.
First, the acquired companies tended to be profitable, indeed, above
average in their profits prior to acquisition.5 7 Thus, contrary to the common notion that the acquisition of a firm reflects problems or inefficient
55. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1986); see also Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really
Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990).

56. I compared the premiums paid in management buyouts with a set of comparable
corporate takeovers, holding year and size roughly comparable. I found no significant difference in the premium paid as a percentage of the pre-acquisition stock price between
those transactions in which management would change and those in which it would stay the
same. Such a result is more consistent with the hypothesis that in acquisitions the new
owners expect to reallocate control over existing wealth within the enterprise than with the
theory that they will increase its total production of wealth. See Peter Carstensen, Explaining Changes in Control of Public Corporations: A Stochastic Wealth Redistribution Hypothesis, Its Proof and Policy Implications (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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operations, the pattern found was one of buying successful businesses
which showed, if anything, increasing profitability immediately prior to
purchase.
Second, despite the fact that the acquired firms were profitable prior to
purchase, the results of acquisition were generally negative. "[B]y any
criterion, profitability fell on average following . . . mergers."58s In
marked contrast, where one of these sample firms entered a line of busi59
ness without merger, it tended to show increasing profits over time.
In part, the failure of mergers reflected efforts by acquirers to "milk"
the newly acquired assets. 6° This is consistent with the wealth reallocation explanation for takeover premiums. The buyer pays a premium
which it recoups by extracting existing wealth from the target. Indeed,
when the acquired businesses were sold off as independent units, they
to exhibit increased operating efficiency and renewed profitabiltended
ity. 61 In general, the consequences of acquisitions were negative and a
substantial cost to the economy. "[M]erger effects help explain roughly a
tenth of the productivity decline [in the Gross National Product]-a modest contribution, but not so small that it can be ignored." 62
The implications for competition policy and merger analysis are reasonably clear. Mergers neither have historically been nor currently are a
means of producing substantial improvements in economic efficiency.
There are other reasons, related to equity and dynamics, for public policy
to encourage the purchase and sale of business assets. But the up-shot of
Scherer and Ravencraft's analysis is that there were few, if any, efficiency
gains from mergers in general. Hence, a strict public policy toward mergers does not pose a serious threat to economic efficiency overall in the
economy.
2. The Reaffirmation of the Costs of Concentration
Professor Leonard Weiss and associates re-examined the traditional hypothesis that concentrated market structures lead to higher prices. 63 In
the 1960s and 1970s most scholars had tested this claim by looking at the
correlation between profits and concentration. The initial work had often
found a general correlation. This, in turn, was regarded as evidence that
tacit collusion among oligopolists had raised prices and consequently
profits in such markets. Critics pointed out that if entry were a real possibility, abnormally high profits more likely reflected greater efficiency and
economies of scale or scope which permitted larger firms to earn profits.
Assuming easy entry, profits based on mere collusion would be very vulnerable to ordinary price competition from new entrants. As more so58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

93 (emphasis in original).
95.
140.
191.
RAvENSCRAFr, supra note 52, at 203.
Weiss, supra note 53.
Id. at
Id at
Id. at
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phisticated econometric analyses of the data were made, however, the
correlation between structure and profit became weaker and weaker. Ultimately, the critics triumphed-but only in the sense that they established that there is no clear correlation between profit levels and
concentration across industries.
In the leading survey of both theory and empirical work in this earlier
period, Weiss pointed out that the theory actually predicted that prices
would be higher in concentrated markets. 64 The empirical tests assumed
that higher prices would be reflected in higher profits. This assumption
implies that the firms in such a market made no investment and incurred
no special costs to protect their market structure, and that firms have
some common level of efficiency that is independent of the market context. Other theorists, however, had already posited two explanations for
why observed profits might be unreliable measures. As Chief Judge
Charles Wyzanski put it: "[A] quiet life is the chief reward of monopoly
power.' '65 This is more broadly reflected in the theory of X-inefficiency
developed by Leibenstein, inefficiency which theorizes that economic actors do not necessarily behave with full efficiency in all circumstances. 66
A second line of thought, associated with the work of Oliver Williamson,
suggests that if owners have limited power to control the allocation of
monopoly profits, those profits might be dedicated to, for instance, fancy
buildings and higher salaries so that the books of the enterprise would
67
not reflect any abnormal accounting profits.
These various considerations made observed profits a poor measure of
the consequences of concentration. Indeed, they were used, despite their
many obvious weaknesses, because this kind of data is relatively available
for analysis, while reliable price data is more difficult to obtain. The triumph of the critics of this line of scholarship lay, therefore, only in the
convincing demonstration that reported profits bore no particular relationship to concentration. That hardly provided a conclusive resolution
of the question of the consequences of concentration. In large part, the
critics relied on the evidence of a lack of unusually large profits as evidence of competitiveness and efficiency in those markets. In doing so,
they committed the same analytical error that they had criticized in the
earlier studies.
Weiss 68 started with the basic proposition that the hypothesis about
concentrated markets posited that prices, and not necessarily profits,
would be higher. Hence, he and various associates looked for data that
64. Leonard W. Weiss, The Concentration - Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).
65. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
66. See Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency Versus "X-Efficiency", 56 AM.
ECON. REv. 392 (1966).
67. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING

68. Weiss, supra note 53.
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compared prices in concentrated and unconcentrated markets. These
comparisons either contrasted contemporaneous prices in concentrated
and unconcentrated markets or compared prices from periods of greater
and lesser concentration. The book reports at length on five studies.
These included a comparative examination of cement prices-in regional
markets over time, prices resulting in timber and oil land auction markets
when the number of bidders varied, the impact of the European Common
Market on prices in various sectors of industry, the relationship of wages
to concentration, and a more complex multi-sector analysis of the relationships among changes in concentration, cost, demand and price.
In addition, Weiss surveyed studies by others covering six quite disparate economic sectors: newspaper advertising, airline fares, retailing, rail
rates, live cattle purchases by meat packers, and banking. Over this wide
range of industries, there was a consistent pattern that associated higher
concentration with higher prices, regardless of the level of profit.
Weiss summed up the results of these studies in a table showing that, of
121 studies of the relationship of concentration to prices, 76 (62.8%)
showed statistically significant positive effects for concentration and another 30 (24.8%) had positive effects that fell short of being statistically
significant. 69 Thus, over eighty-seven percent of all the studies located
were consistent with the proposition that the level of concentration influences prices. In contrast, only 4 studies showed significant negative effects (3.3%), while another 11 studies showed negative effects lacking
statistical significance. Summing up the results of his study, Weiss said, "I
believe that our evidence that concentration is correlated with price is
overwhelming. '70 Weiss also noted, however, that the direct costs of concentration are not "our most serious economic problem." 71 But this is
true because this "country... has taken antitrust more seriously than any
other country for close to a century. '72 Thus, enforced competition, in
Weiss's view, has minimized but not eliminated the direct costs of allowing concentration and its associated incentives for cooperation.
From a broader perspective, Weiss's studies suggest that concentration
does not correlate with any obvious increase in efficiency. Indeed, concentrated markets had higher prices but not higher profits. In light of the
presence of higher prices in these concentrated markets, the lack of abnormal profit noted by critics now takes on a different meaning. The direct implication is that firms in the concentrated markets were less rather
than more efficient when compared to firms, often of smaller absolute
size, operating in competitive markets. Other empirical work, notably in
the electric generation business, 73 is consistent with this. The theory of
X-inefficiency, the Williamson hypothesis of reallocated monopoly prof69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Weiss, supra note 53, at 267 and table 13.1.
ld at 283.
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its, and the potential that the protection of a stable market position may,
in itself, justify extra expenditures to ensure coordination and cooperation also might contribute to a weaker, but more plausible claim: concentrated markets generally lack an inherent efficiency advantages over
unconcentrated markets. 74 Moreover, in practice such markets seem to
generate higher prices. On balance, the implication is that public policy
should avoid creating or maintaining concentration in markets. Indeed,
the implication is that reversing concentration and stimulating competition will lower prices, although probably not by much. More importantly,
but not really addressed by Weiss's analysis, firms will have stronger incentives to seek technical efficiency and innovation because it will be
more likely to yield a payoff relative to efforts to promote cooperation.
Weiss focused only on the consequences of concentration and not how
those consequences occurred, yet Axelrod's theory and Lamoreaux's history provide a very suggestive explanation. Concentration in a relatively
stable environment creates a long future shadow. Cooperation emerges
as the best option for such firms once they have discovered they can
make reasonable predictions about the responses of others. The patterns
of economic behavior observed in the 1890s and early 1900s have continued viability exactly because they reflect the kind of strategy that makes
long-run sense: Invest in creating barriers to new entry, stabilize the technology to reduce future uncertainty, and then coordinate competition.
The result is the quiet life for oligopolists and long-run decline for the
economy.
III.

THE REDISCOVERED LEARNING OF THE 1980s:
IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY

Prior to the 1980s most individuals concerned with antitrust believed
that collusion, both express and tacit, was a major problem for the American economy and that concentrated market structures were likely to produce both unilateral and interdependent anticompetitive conduct.
Broadly defined per se rules were invoked to condemn agreements, horizontal and vertical, that imposed restraints despite various claims of economic efficiency. Similarly, merger among competitors where those firms
had significant market shares, as well as among large firms generally,
should be subject to very restrictive standards. In addition, policy-makers
continually sought to find ways to eliminate or deconcentrate existing oigopoly and shared monopoly structures.
In the later 1970s, a number of studies questioned the premise of a
strong relationship between structure and conduct. 75 The two claims
74. See Pitofsky, supra note 54 (discussing X-inefficiency); WILLIAMSON, supra note 67
(discussing alternative uses of profits); Richard Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and
Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975) (discussing the wasteful use of monopoly profits to
protect a monopoly position).
75. One of the best compendiums on this debate is INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:
THE
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made on behalf of the new learning were that concentrated structures
arose in response to economies of scale and that they are not associated
with anticompetitive or inefficient conduct-collective or unilateral. A
second strand to this critique was that collusion itself is difficult and hard
to maintain. Profit-maximizing firms will "cheat" on the cartel, and so
conspiracy is not a feasible strategy except in very limited circumstances.
Indeed, a few critics76have gone so far as to suggest that the antitrust laws
should be repealed.
The acceptance of this new learning about concentration and collusion
lead to two consequences for antitrust policy. First, it justified a substantial de-emphasis on challenging mergers even when they created what
had heretofore been considered major increases in concentration. Indeed, the combination of the belief in the efficiency of most mergers and
the presumption that neither they could, nor would, have significant negative competitive effect meant that even when objectionable under the
new relaxed guidelines, those enforcing the law were loath to object, and
thus sought only the most limited divestiture of those parts of the business which created the greatest changes in concentration. "Fix it first"
became part of the strategy of antitrust enforcement. This usually resulted in consolidating large enterprises even if the target's parts were
distributed among other large firms. The antitrust agencies defined their
role as that of merger facilitators rather than as gatekeepers who were to
limit the number of such combinations.
Second, the new learning undermined the traditional judicial analytic
model for judging the lawfulness of mergers. Traditionally, mergers between significant competitors were subject to a strong presumption of illegality. Stimulated by the new perspectives about merger, the courts
increasingly demanded proof that the particular merger being challenged
would, in fact, have specific, identifiable effects on competition. 77 Such a
standard imposes great burdens on those who would object and creates a
range for judicial discretion that is extraordinarily broad.
Third, courts became increasingly skeptical of the anticompetitive potential of many types of restraints.78 An element underlying that skepticism is an acceptance of the implications of the new learning: businesses
act primarily to improve efficiency. Hence, any restraint or other business practice having potential (i.e., theoretical) positive effects is pre76. E.g., D.T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986). See
also, THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
(Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1994).
77. United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984); Fruehauf
Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979).
78. See, e.g., Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2578,2598 (1993) (below costs prices intended to inflict harm on a competitor not unlawful
when record failed to show that predator was certain to reap monopoly profits in the future); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988) (agreement
to refuse to deal with a price cutter not unlawful when no specific resale price had been
set).
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sumed good absent a clear and convincing showing that it is
79
anticompetitive.
In this Part, I first discuss at some length the evolution of strict merger
standards in the 1960s and their subsequent diminution in the later 1970s
and 1980s. This sequence of events shows how the new learning justified
reduced vigilance. Once the suppressed learning of the 1980s is taken
into account, however, the dangers to the economy of such weakened
standards becomes evident. In most respects, the most effective way to
enforce competition is to retain and promote unconcentrated markets
through strict merger standards. Following the discussion of merger law,
I will briefly discuss the implications of the suppressed learning of the
1980s for the law governing anticompetitive conduct (both predatory actions and restrictive agreements) and that which addresses the problem of
existing monopoly and oligopoly market structures.

A.
1.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF MERGER STANDARDS

The Pre-1980 Development of the Law

Traditional antitrust analysis in merger cases, employed a method
which I call presumptive illegality. 80 Once the challenger demonstrated
that a merger involved parties whose market position exceeded a relevant
threshold in any market, then the entire combination was presumptively
illegal. The courts would not weigh the degree of applicability to the particular case of the general conclusions which justified the presumption,
nor would they finely calibrate their assessment of likely outcomes. Any
combination which exceeded the limit, was presumed unlawful. This was
not, however, an absolute or per se illegality. Defendants might still prevail even if they lost on the issues of market definition and market share.
But in rebutting the presumption, they had to fit themselves to limited
categories. For example, proof that one of the parties was a failing firm
would excuse its acquisition. Proof that the existing market shares created no inference about future market power because of industry peculiarities would also suffice. 8 ' One can see the development of the rule of
presumptive illegality in the case law from Brown Shoe to Philadelphia
Bank to Continental Can. This evolution also responded to the innovative ways in which defense lawyers tried to make each case an ad hoc
exercise in evaluation.
79. Such cases do occur. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985) (refusal to deal found to have only anticompetitive purpose);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,479 (1992) (refusal to sell
replacement parts to competitors found to be potentially illegal exclusion); Palmer v. BRG
of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46,49-50 (1990) (agreement to exploit market found to be per se
illegal).
80. This method is also used to decide certain kinds of conduct cases (e.g. tying) and
may better explain the traditional rules on vertical restraints than does the usual "per se"
label.
81. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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It seems fairly certain that the Court initially had no presumption of
illegality in mind. In the first decision interpreting the revised Clayton
Act, Brown Shoe, the Court suggested that structural inferences while
"an important consideration ... will seldom be determinative." 82 Only
"[i]f the share of the market ...is so large that it approaches monopoly
83
proportions .... ." will such a structural fact alone establish a violation.
Conversely "foreclosure of a de minimis share of the market will not tend
'substantially to lessen competition.' "84 The Court found that in both its
vertical and horizontal aspects, the Brown Shoe merger was at neither
extreme. 85 Hence, legality or illegality necessarily turn on a consideration of other relevant factors-presumably non-structural considerations.
However, the actual analysis reveals the difficulty of employing any but
structural considerations. The vertical evaluation relied on the "very nature and purpose of the arrangement" which, of course, was to achieve
vertical integration which foreclosed outside suppliers. 86 But any vertical
merger which exceeds the de minimis threshold will have this "most important ... factor .. ." and so will suggest violation. 87 In addition, the
Court considered a "trend toward concentration in the industry" as relevant, but this is simply an elaboration of structural information. 88 It also
declared that "probable effects [of the merger] upon the economic way of
life" were important.8 9 But that is at best a make-weight applicable to
any situation. It does not differentiate cases within the two thresholds.
Ultimately, the Court seems to rely on a pregnant negative as much as
any other factor to justify the illegality finding on the vertical issues; the
merger conferred no "countervailing competitive, economic, or social
advantages."90
The horizontal analysis is remarkably similar: "Market share... is one
of the most important factors to be considered..." 91 The significance of
the shares involved was then elaborated on in an infamous passage which
interpreters frequently conclude declares that mergers which may produce efficiencies are more objectionable than others.92 While that is
probably not a very good interpretation of what the Court had in mind,
the central observation from the perspective of the development of
merger law is that the deeper analysis of the merger turns out to be simply a commentary on specific aspects of the structural (market share)
facts. The Court also invoked the trend toward concentration, another
82. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962) (vertical analysis); Id. at
343 (horizontal analysis).
83. Id. at 328.

84. Id. at 329 (emphasis in original) (quoting the language of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 329, 344-45.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 332.

89. Id. at 333.

90. Id. at 334.
91. Id. at 343.
92. Id. at 344.
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structural fact, to justify illegality and also emphasized the failure of the
defendants to "present[ ] ... mitigating factors. . . ,,93 Thus, despite a
promise of in-depth analysis, simple, external structural facts were the
only evidence the court employed that might differentiate this case from
others.
A year later in the Philadelphia Bank decision, the Court expressly
adopted a presumptive approach but still was unwilling to make the presumption a strong one.94 The Court emphasized that the question was
not "susceptible of a ready and precise answer in most cases." 95
"[R]elevant economic data are both complex and elusive." 96 This justified creation, for cases "in which it is possible," of a less all-encompassing
factual analysis. 97 Hence,
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in
the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to
lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing98 that the merger is not likely to
have such anticompetitive effects.
This presumption was expressly based on the scholarly work of Bain,
Mason, Machlup, and Kaysen, who all expounded a view that concentrated markets were likely to be anticompetitive. 99 In addition, the Court
looked to the market shares found in various conduct cases under the
Clayton Act that had justified findings of illegality. The presumption
shifted the burden to the defendants to show "clearly" that such a merger
lacked "such anticompetitive effects." This "effects" analysis if not constrained can easily become an ad hoc series of particularized claims for
the proposition that this specific merger will not have long run bad
effects.
Indeed, in PhiladelphiaBank, the banks had contended that competition in banking would still be vigorous despite the merger based on the
testimony of bankers and economic experts, that the existence of other
small banks insured sufficient consumer choices, and that commercial
banking "is... immune" to the "anticompetitive effects of undue concentration."'1 Such claims at their core denied the applicability of the structural model of analysis. The Philadelphia Bank opinion rejects each
claim with an ad hoc analysis suggesting that it was unproven in this case
rather than irrelevant. The defendants also offered three affirmative justifications for the merger (responding to Brown Shoe's call for "mitigating factors"). The opinion disposes of each in an ad hoc way which again
93. Id. at 346.
94. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).

95. Id. at 362.
96. Id.
97. Id.

98. Id at 363.
99. Id. at 363 nn.38-39.
100. Id. at 368-70.
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suggests that such claims are worthy of serious attention. 10 1 This leaves
the presumption of illegality weak and apparently rebuttable by either
showing that competition would some how remain in the market or that
countervailing advantages result from the merger.
In the Continental Can decision, which came a year after Philadelphia
Bank, the nature of the "anticompetitive effects" of merger were
refocused on the inherent consequences of any merger and the inferences
to be drawn from structural change were restated and clarified in a way
that made them irrefutable. 10 2 The primary issue in the case was market
definition, but the trial judge in dismissing after the government had
rested had also concluded that the record failed to justify the application
of the PhiladelphiaBank presumption or that the record already rebutted
that presumption. In reversing this conclusion, Justice White, writing for
the Court, focused on the inherent consequences of any merger for competition between or among the combing firms as the essential anticompetitive effect of the merger. 0 3 Thus, given that the merging firms' shares
exceeded the PhiladelphiaBank threshold, the combination would foreclose their future "actual and potential competition" between the merging parties.' 0 4 The resulting firm "acquired . . . the power" for its
management to "guide the development of [the acquired firm] consistently with [the acquirer's] interest ....-"105 The opinion restates this same
theme of consolidated control in three other ways, all of which culminate
to reinforce and generalize the basic analysis. °6 Again, the central
theme of this discussion is that a merger inherently affects competition
because it results in the elimination of the competitive freedom of the
acquired party. If the structural facts are such that this is a "substantial"
change in market structure, then it inherently has the anticompetitive effects arising from the fact of common control. A successful rebuttal,
therefore, has to address the initial step, the presumption of the substantiality of the effect rather than offering ad hoc arguments claiming that the
effect in this case given the structural change with its inherent loss of
competition would some how not occur.
In addition, the opinion asserts this merger may trigger other comparable mergers. 0 7 This is another significant effect whose non-existence can
not be proven. Thus, the specific merger is not only a source of concern
because of the competition that it eliminates but also because of its potential to induce parallel actions by other firms.
In sum, these are the irrefutable consequences of any merger. There is
no way to disprove them because consolidated control and imitation are
undeniable consequences. This makes the case specific anti-competitive
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

PhiladelphiaBank, 374 U.S. at 370-72.
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
Id. at 462-66.
Id. at 463.
Id.

106. Id. at 463-65.
107. Id. at 464.
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effects presumption of Philadelphia Bank effectively irrebuttable. But
the faith must abide that the assumed general implications of such concentration are valid. False negatives will be unlikely events. The assumption that such combinations rarely, if ever, yield efficiencies not otherwise
achievable, means that false positives will create no major social loss.
This strong presumption from structural factors rested on the what
courts thought they knew about the implications of concentrated markets. There were two central beliefs. First, such market structure lead to
anticompetitive conduct. Prices were raised, output decreased, innovation and competitiveness sagged. Second, concentrated markets were unnecessary to achieve economies and efficiencies in production. Hence, a
general predictive balancing would show that there was little likelihood
of social gain from such mergers or from monopoly structures and a substantial risk of social costs. This analysis then justified a general and
strong presumption against combinations which substantially moved markets toward concentration.
The courts, and especially the Supreme Court, found support for the
implications of concentrated structure in advance of most work of economists on this topic. These conclusions rested on a relatively small body of
empirical work and a theoretical model which invoked a very strongly
108
deterministic relationship of structure to conduct and performance.
Once the courts adopted this hypothesis, the scholars tested it. Out of
that testing was to come the new learning of the later 1970s.
The judicial reliance on general structural inference also had a significant basis in the problems of developing administrable rules. The alternative of case specific analysis aimed at discovering the probable effects
of any specific merger on market structure and conduct did not offer a
consistent set of outcomes. Predicting the expected effects of a particular
merger is very difficult because at that level the micro issues of managerial intent, plant specific expectations, specific customer responses and
other comparable details can overwhelm the broader analysis of the
transaction. In consequence, the results of such an approach would have
to be ad hoc, and case specific, and unreviewable on predictable bases
which would make general planning all but impossible.
As applied in the late 1960s and as codified in the 1968 Merger Guidelines, these standards were relatively strict. 10 9 Moreover, a comparable
presumptive model evolved to govern cases involving conglomerate type
combinations. Its internal logic was weaker. It focused on the markets of
the combining firms and declared that specific effects were likely to occur. Judicial enthusiasm for this approach was not overwhelming, but
even so, by the middle 1970s it was embedded in the case law. 1 0 Yet,
108. See Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigmof Industrial Organization, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 487 (1983).
109. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) i
4430 (1968).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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even as it was being embraced, its failure to describe the realities of the
competitive impacts of such combinations was sufficiently great, that it
never had strong judicial support."1
2. The Decline of Strong Merger Law
By the early 1970s, the two fundamental hypotheses that had supported
the evolution of strong rules of presumptive illegality were under increasingly serious intellectual attack. The primary attack focused on the proposition that concentrated industries exhibited anticompetitive conduct
and performance. The critics argued that if concentrated markets were
not a source of serious problems with respect to excessive profits or reduced output, then a strict anti-merger policy could only harm efficiency-the only conceivable alternative explanation for such
transactions. A variety of studies purported to show that profits in oligopoly industries did not significantly differ from those in more competitively structured industries. The implication drawn from this data was
that there could not be collusion because there was no observable profit
effect. A second body of work purported to show that profits were quite
varied among participants in concentrated markets. The higher profits of
market dominant firms was in turn attributed to their greater efficiency
rather than to collusion. Moreover, without critical evaluation, this variance in profit levels was declared to be inconsistent with collusion. Colluders would want, so this argument suggested, equal profits.
A second line of attack focused on the second premise underlying the
presumption of illegality: efficiency goals did not justify either existing
concentration or combinations which increased concentration. Here the
attack was less direct but the basic proposition was clear: concentration
can only exist if it is efficient. In part the proof of this claim rested on a
priori reasoning. Absent legal barriers to entry, only efficient market
structures could survive in the long run. Hence survival was proof of efficiency. The lack of unusually high profits demonstrated that market
power was not a plausible explanation for market concentrating combinations or concentrated structures. Yet they existed and were occurring;
hence they must be for other efficiency reasons. Such disproofs of monopoly (anticompetitive) purpose or effect, often defined with extraordinary narrowness, were, therefore, proof of the converse.
In addition, Williamson demonstrated in a very influential article that
modest improvements in efficiency could offset fairly large increments to
market power."12 This proof added powerfully to the intellectual respect111. The problem lay in the effort to make very specific predictions about which firm
would enter which concentrated market. The failure to develop more general statements
of the theory of anticompetitive effect with respect to such mergers (the outlines of a
broader theory can be glimpsed in the majority opinion in Procter & Gamble) meant that
the legal attacks on them were substantially more vulnerable to rebuttal. See, e.g., United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
112. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 699 (1977).
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ability of the new pro-merger, pro-concentration analysis. Even if a
merger or a structure would cause some anticompetitive effects, Williamson's proof showed that modest efficiency gains could outweigh the competitive costs, leaving society, on balance, with lower cost and higher
levels of production. Implicit in Williamson's argument was the idea that
larger scale firms would be likely, in general, to obtain efficiency gains
and that merger was the only route to achieving such scale. Only by
granting these assumptions as plausible statements about the real world
of economic competition can Williamson's proof have any significance for
the analysis of merger.
The judicial response to the new legitimization of merger and concentrated markets was not surprising. Courts again asked much more ad hoc
type questions. Was this merger likely to harm substantially some specific
competitive context? 113 The result was that the case law tipped strongly
toward requirements of proof that a particular combination or particular
market context was tainted with bad motives or had immediate, demonstrable bad effects.
The courts have not explicitly reversed the earlier case law which rejected the balancing of gains and losses to competition, but they have
become insistent that mergers usually achieve many legitimate efficiency
functions. This assumption underlies and explains why the courts now
insist on stronger, more specific proof of anticompetitiveness. If the anticompetitiveness is not proven or is not "substantial," then by default,
the only explanation for the combination is that it will create some sort of
efficiency. The evolution of merger enforcement policy in the 1980s at
both the FTC and the Antitrust Division illustrated these radical changes
in merger analysis.
Current enforcement philosophy retains the structural-presumptive
model, but only in the Brown Shoe sense; structural facts set some outer
boundaries. But, unlike the earlier period, it is the upper and not the
lower boundary which is the focal point. In any context in which nonmarket power explanations might have significance they are presumed
valid and dispositive. Only when a merger crosses the upper boundary is
there concern, but consistent with the new learning that mergers usually
promote efficiency, only the most minimal intervention is permissible.
Mergers are encouraged and settlements made to facilitate them.
In the late 1980s, the pendulum did begin to swing back toward a less
aggressively passive attitude toward the role of government. Starting
with the Bush administration, there has been a return to a mildly active
antitrust stance based on some recognition that retaining effectively competitive markets is essential to desirable long run economic performance.
With the return of some antitrust commitment, the question is whether
the received learning of the 1980s about collusion and concentration is
113. See, e.g., United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); FrC v.
Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1989); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345 (2d
Cir. 1979); FTC v. British Oxygen Co., 437 F. Supp. 79 (D. Del. 1977).
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really an appropriate basis for setting policy priorities for the next
century.
3.

Toward a Restored Pro-Competitive Merger Policy

The four works discussed in Part II of this essay, taken together, raise
very serious, core questions about the theoretical and empirical basis for
the claims of the new learning that a relaxed anti-merger policy is appropriate public policy. Axelrod has shown us that collusion, especially of
the tacit kind involving large enterprise, is theoretically possible on terms
that are durable. Both Lamoreaux's history and Weiss's survey of a wide
range of empirical studies are entirely consistent with the conclusion that
where the number of players in an industry is limited and the shadow of a
cooperative future looms large, the result is very likely to be an evolution
of cooperation. Moreover, these works show that self-conscious economic actors have strong incentives to seek out ways to organize markets
and market relationships that will increase the potential for such cooperation. Greater barriers to new entry mean that all firms in the market
increasingly have a shared interest in the long run future. Stabilizing
technology and distribution systems to reduce the risks of disruption take
on added importance once it is understood that these activities aid an
underlying potential for durable collusion.
The lessons of the 1890s are clear. If concentrated market structures
are permitted, as they were in that period, the result will be the search for
and development of strategies that make cooperation attractive and effective. Enforced competition through strict enforcement of anti-conspiracy
law, can, as Weiss suggests, minimized the harms that may result because
it reduces the future shadow cast by the hope for successful and undetected collusion. But, as Scherer and Ravenscraft as well as Weiss and
Lamoreaux show, society gets no net benefit from combinations that create such market structures in the first place. Enforcing effective competition is easier if the conditions for evolution of cooperation are never
created. In such contexts, the future shadows of cooperative gains are
never present. The shadows cast by such a future necessarily must be
ones that involve vigorous competition and the consequent need to be
efficient and innovative.
Retention of markets with many competitors becomes an important
policy goal in itself for reasons of current and future economic behavior.
This is not a populist attack on bigness. It is a proposition based on the
economic costs and benefits (if any) of large scale market dominance. It
is particularly important that both the Weiss study and the Ravenscraft
and Scherer work failed to confirm the oft repeated claim of relative efficiency for large enterprises or for mergers involving such enterprises.
This is consistent with Lamoreaux's observations about the merger wave
of the 1890s. Moreover, as we have seen, it is possible to explain the
premiums paid in takeovers on bases other than expected efficiency gains
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in production. Thus, the case for merger like the case for concentration
turns out to be deeply flawed.
The strategy of allowing large scale combinations and concentration of
assets in the broad field of telecommunications that is occurring today
illustrates the kind of bad policy choice that has already undermined the
success of airline deregulation. The failure to stop combinations and consolidations in the health care field is another stark example of destroying
the potential for a viable, competitive market. In its place, we will have
increased "cooperation" among large providers who control the scarce
resource (patients) and who come, after some experience, to appreciate
the long shadow of a cooperative future.
As we move into the next century, it is very hard to predict where specific market changes will occur. What one can say is that the long run
economic interest in efficient and dynamic markets will be best served by
a policy that discourages the concentration of markets. One can also say
that these studies vindicate the common sense of the traditional law constructed to govern mergers. Concentration is generally undesirable. It
should be avoided-strict rules against large mergers and consolidations
will achieve that goal.

B.

MONOPOLY AND OTHER CONCENTRATED MARKET STRUCTURES

In the few monopoly cases decided in prior to the 1980s, a similar trend
exists toward a presumption that once the structural characteristics exist,
the bad effects necessarily follow. 1 14 Nevertheless, proof that the monopoly was unavoidable, a type of necessity claim, would exonerate the defendant. These cases focused on structural conditions and their
alteration. A continuing problem was the scope of these presumptions.
The successful dissolution of AT&T (despite the problems that many
commentators have discerned) demonstrates that it is quite feasible to
reorganize even very large and complex enterprises.
Because concentration was not seen as a serious negative, the law of
monopoly moved toward a much more tolerant stance in the 1980s. The
cases almost exclusively involved issues of conduct in which the structural
character of the market was not going to be changed. In these cases, the
courts and FTC correctly concluded that mere possession of monopoly
power and its conscious retention or exploitation was not sufficient to
create a violation." 5 Unfortunately this analysis has been understood to
apply as well to monopoly and oligopoly market structures. Thus, these
114. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
115. See, e.g., In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), aff'd, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir.
1982), vacated and remanded, 461 U.S. 940 (1983); Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695
F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v.
FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510
F.2d 894 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); In re E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 705 (1980).
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decisions rejected the older learning of Alcoa,116 DuPont (Cellophane),117
and Grinnell'18 that monopoly and its willful acquisition or retention constituted the offense (effectively a presumption of illegality) where a structure remedy was sought and feasible.
The suppressed learning of the 1980s, however, teaches that policymakers should retain a serious concern for markets which are already
concentrated. They do in fact perform poorly as Weiss's studies show.
Alexrod's theory, which Lamoreaux found in historical experience, is that
such market structures do in fact lend themselves to anticompetitive behavior and do not produce significant economic gains. This is true both
for clearly monopoly markets, of which few exist, and for markets with
substantial and lasting concentration.
What is called for is innovative solutions to the problem of creating
effective remedies. The goal has to be to destroy the long shadow of a
future involving cooperative control that overhangs so many of these
markets. This revives the concern for lowering barriers to entry and creating uncertainty as to the future actions of other market participants.
These problems were high on the agenda of antitrust for many decades.
They merit continued concern.
C.

RESTRAINTS AND PREDATORY CONDUCT

Prior to 1980, strong rules condemned many horizontal and vertical
agreements as well as many trade practices which had exclusionary effects. Starting with the Sylvania decision in the mid-1970s, 119 the
Supreme Court has backed away from these rules. Increasingly in the
1980s the Court came to articulate a view of collective agreements and
exclusionary practices that emphasized their potential for enhancing efficiency. Indeed, in the Sharp decision, the Court professed itself unable to
imagine any anticompetitive potential for non-price distribution restraints. 120 While recent decisions, such as Kodak,' 2' suggest that the
Court is returning to a more balanced perspective on the potential for
harm that exclusionary conduct creates, the fact remains that the seachange in thinking about restraints and explicitly anticompetitive activity
remained dominant throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.
Here again the suppressed learning of the 1980s strongly supports a
more skeptical view of business conduct. It is especially important to
read Axelrod's tit for tat strategy against the pattern of conduct that
Lamoreaux describes. The theory predicts that exclusionary actions directed at existing competitors will have as their goal inducing cooperation
and not total exclusion. The objective is to show the wayward competitor
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

148 F.2d at 416.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1977).
384 U.S. at 563.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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that cooperation will yield greater profits. A different strategy motives
response to actual or potential entry. There exclusion is a goal because
that ensures the long run future stream of profits that will arise from cooperation. If one uses this history and theory to examine cases such as
Sylvania,122 Sharp,123 and Monsanto,124 the lack of any substantial, creditable efficiency gains is noticeable, but at the same time, one can readily
see how the pattern of restraints might well fit into a long run scheme or
plan to achieve a situation in which the future shadow of cooperation is
made stronger and more substantial.
Even I concede that there are many plausible efficiency explanations
for agreements, especially in the context of distribution, which also impose restraints. Exclusionary conduct is also competitive conduct, i.e.,
price competition which results in lower prices necessarily excludes the
least efficient producers. My suggestion is not that the four books examined here in themselves justify a strict prohibition on all forms of restraints and exclusion. Rather, I suggest that the recent trend in the
courts to embrace the benign explanation for such conduct and to refuse
to give any credence to the anticompetitive hypotheses is misguided as a
matter of theory and history.
A more balanced and skeptical examination of these cases is in order.
What the suppressed learning tells is that such actions may have undesirable consequences and so should be viewed with skepticism. After all,
the Sherman Act prohibits "all" contracts in restraint of trade so it is not
unreasonable to impose on the proponent of a restraint which raises concerns a real burden to establish its positive contribution to economic efficiency. Similarly, when markets are concentrated and dominant firms
engage in conduct having clear exclusionary effect, it is not rational, in
light of the work discussed here, to ignore the potential for creating and
maintaining long run, anticompetitive cooperation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The attack on the traditional view that concentration was highly suspect rested on challenges to the two key premises justifying the presumptive illegality of such situations. The challenge always rested more on
logic, deductions from models, especially static models, than on empirical
observation of the world. The one proposition subject to intensive tests,
the profitability of concentrated industries, was always a second best test
in terms of the theory being tested.
The suppressed scholarship of the 1980s presents us with a strong case
for the traditional view. Historical and contemporary studies of the consequences of concentration show that they are likely to be anticompetitive. Moreover, Axelrod's work gives a far better theory to explain why
such patterns of cooperation might be expected to arise and continue
122. 433 U.S. at 36.
123. 485 U.S. at 717.
124. Spray-Rite v. Monsanto, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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over time. Axelrod's work also provides a strong theoretical justification
for an expansive view of concentration. It is the links between firms that
stimulate efforts to cooperate. This makes vertical and conglomerate
combination more suspect than traditional theory would have suggested.
It also suggests that the narrow view of the traditional theory that focused
on selected markets and market arrangements may have been too constricted to detect the effects of such combinations on competition.
Finally, the new scholarship provides a basis strongly to reject the
claims that concentrated markets are necessarily efficient markets and
that mergers are likely to improve productive efficiency. In combination
the work on corporate acquisitions and concentrated markets suggests
that neither claim is valid and that alternative theory can better explain
the data that we have.
In sum, the courts and the enforcement agencies should be less tolerant
of concentration increasing combinations. On balance, the positive effects are few and unlikely while the negative effects are significant and
more likely. The lesson of the these studies is that the effects can be
indirect and hard to detect in specific situations. This justifies a strong
presumption against such combinations and against conduct which reinforces such structures. It also urges that we continue to seek to define
legal standards which would allow direct challenges to concentrated
structures.
The history of antitrust is that defenders of business as it is and of its
freedom of action will continue to make claims, as they have from the
outset of the Sherman Act, that size and market dominance are important factors in achieving socially desirable economic performance. There
should be no illusions: refuting the present set of claims will not silence
the defenders of the established order. We can expect a new set of assertions and criticisms. The longer run lesson that might well be learned is
that traditional wisdom should not be too easily overthrown in the face of
carping critics. Critical examination of the critics claims will, one might
reasonably expect, reveal the fallacies that they contain.

